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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Scope
This memorandum analyzes whether each of the nine crimes against humanity
enumerated in Article 5 of the Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) Law
was part of customary international law during 1975-1979. More specifically, it considers
whether the crimes against humanity of “murder,” “extermination,” “enslavement,”
“deportation,” “imprisonment,” “torture,” “rape,” “persecution on political, racial, or religious
grounds,” and “other inhumane acts” were part of customary international law during 1975-1979.
In addition, this memorandum also analyzes whether these crimes are prosecutable under Article
5 of the ECCC Law.1*
B. Summary of Conclusions
1. The prohibition of murder was part of customary international law during the
period of 1975-1979.
The prohibition of murder was part of customary international law during the period of
1975-1979. The prohibition of murder can be considered a widespread practice of states because
it is outlawed under every legal system on Earth, and it has been considered as a crime against
humanity by the United Nations and the major Allied Powers as early as 1945. The prohibition
of murder can be considered opinio juris because states feel an obligation to prosecute it in their
domestic courts and in the international tribunals.
2. The prohibition of extermination was part of customary international law
during the period of 1975-1979.

1* Were the crimes against humanity enumerated in article 5 of the ECCC Law part of customary international law
during 1975-1979? If yes, are these crimes prosecutable under article 5 of the ECCC Law?
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The prohibition of extermination was part of customary international law during the
period of 1975-1979. The prohibition of extermination can be considered a widespread practice
of states because it is recognized as a crime against humanity under numerous international and
national legal systems and agreements, and it has been enumerated as a crime against humanity
in every international tribunal. It is opinio juris because states have felt an obligation to
prosecute and punish it in those tribunals.
3. The prohibition on enslavement was part of customary international law during
the period of 1975-1979.
The prohibition on enslavement was part of customary international law during the period
of 1975-1979. The prohibition on enslavement has become the practice of states because the
international community has created numerous international instruments that expressly forbid
enslavement. The prohibition of enslavement has become opinio juris because it has been
prosecuted and punished in the International Military Tribunal (IMT), the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), Control Council Law No. 10, the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR), and the ECCC.
4. The prohibition on forcible deportation was part of customary international law
during the period of 1975-1979.
The prohibition on forcible deportation was part of customary international law during
the period of 1975-1979. The prohibition of forcible deportation was part of the widespread
practice of states during 1975-1979. The prohibition of forcible deportation meets the opinio
juris requirement because states have felt a legal obligation to prosecute forcible deportation
throughout the last 65 years.
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5. The prohibition of imprisonment was part of customary international law
during the period of 1975-1979.
The prohibition of imprisonment was part of customary international law during the
period of 1975-1979. The prohibition of arbitrary imprisonment was part of the widespread
practice of states during 1975-1979. Numerous international instruments prohibit arbitrary
imprisonment. It is opinio juris because the international community has prosecuted arbitrary
imprisonment as a crime against humanity under Control Council Law No. 10, the ICTY, the
ICTR, the SCSL, and the ECCC.
6. The prohibition of torture was part of customary international law during the
period of 1975-1979.
The prohibition of torture was part of customary international law during the period of
1975-1979. The prohibition of torture was both part of the widespread practice of states, and
opinio juris. International instruments such as the Convention against Torture indicate the
widespread practice of states, while the formation of the International Tribunals to prosecute and
punish this crime indicates that it has become opinio juris.
7. The prohibition of rape was part of customary international law during the
period of 1975-1979.
The prohibition of rape was part of customary international law during the period of
1975-1979. The prohibition of rape was part of the widespread practice of states during 19751979. This is evidenced by Article 44 of the Lieber Code, Control Council Law No.10, and
Article 27 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War (IV). The prohibition of rape meets the opinio juris requirement because states have felt a
legal obligation to prosecute rape in multiple international tribunals. The international
community has prosecuted and punished rape as a crime against humanity under Control Council
Law No. 10, the ICTY, the ICTR, the SCSL, and the ECCC.
10

8. The prohibition of persecution on political, racial, or religious grounds was part
of customary international law during the period of 1975-1979.
The prohibition of persecution on political, racial, or religious grounds was part of
customary international law during the period of 1975-1979. The Charter of the International
Military Tribunal, the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, and Control
Council Law No. 10 all evidence the fact that the prohibition of persecutions on political, racial,
or religious grounds was part of the widespread practice of states. The prosecution and
punishment of persecution on political, racial, or religious grounds by the IMT, the IMTFE,
Control Council Law No. 10, the ICTY, the ICTR, and the ECCC all demonstrate that this
prohibition is opinio juris.
9. The prohibition of other inhumane acts was part of customary international law
during the period of 1975-1979.
The prohibition of other inhumane acts was part of customary international law during
the period of 1975-1979. The Charter of the International Military Tribunal, the Charter of the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East, and Control Council Law No. 10 all evidence the
fact that the prohibition of other inhumane acts was part of the widespread practice of states. The
prosecution and punishment of other inhumane acts by the IMT, the IMTFE, Control Council
Law No. 10, the ICTY, the ICTR, and the ECCC all demonstrate that this prohibition is opinio
juris.
10. The Enumerated crimes against humanity listed under Article 5 of ECCC Law
are prosecutable under Article 5 of the ECCC Law.
The enumerated crimes against humanity listed under Article 5 of ECCC Law are
prosecutable under Article 5 of the ECCC Law because all of the enumerated crimes were part of
customary international law during the period of 1975-1979, and violations of customary
international law are prosecutable in the ECCC.
11

II. BACKGROUND
Under the Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the period of Democratic
Kampuchea, Article 5 states, “The Extraordinary Chambers shall have the power to bring to trial
all Suspects who committed crimes against humanity during the period of 17 April 1975 to 6
January, 1979. Crimes against humanity, which have no statute of limitations, are any acts
committed as a part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population,
on national, political, ethnical, racial, or religious grounds such as:
•

murder;

•

extermination;

•

enslavement;

•

deportation;

•

imprisonment;

•

torture;

•

rape;

•

persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds;

•

other inhumane acts.2

This memo will analyze these nine enumerated crimes and determine whether they were
violations of customary international law during and 1975-1979. This memo will then determine
whether these crimes are prosecutable under article 5 as listed above.

2

Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes
Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, adopted on 27 October 2004, U.N. Doc
NS/RKM/1004/006[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 12].
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III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Determination of Customary International Law
In order to determine whether the nine enumerated crimes were proscribed under
customary international law, an understanding of what customary international law is and how it
is determined is fundamental. According to Professor Michael Scharf3, “Customary International
Law constitutes a widespread practice of states followed out of a sense of legal obligation.”4
Professor Scharf goes on to explain, “To constitute customary international law, a practice must
be followed repetitively by a relatively large number of states over a relatively long period of
time. Customary International Law is made up of two components: (1) a widespread practice of
states; and (2) opinio juris (a sense of legal obligation).”5
According to the comments of Section 102 in the American Law Institute’s Restatement
of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, “The practice necessary to create customary
law might be of comparatively short duration, but …it must be ‘general and consistent.’ A
practice can be general even if it is not universally followed…”6 The Restatement continues,
“For a practice of states to become a rule of customary international law it must appear that the
states follow the practice from a sense of legal obligation…”7
Customary international law is determined in a number of ways. Professor Scharf
explains, “Evidence of practice and opinio juris may be derived from the constitutional,
3

Professor Scharf is the Director of the Fredrick K. Cox International Law Center at Case Western Reserve
University School of Law.
4

Michael Scharf, A Primer on International Law, (2009), at page 2 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
38].
5

Id.

6

American Law Institute, Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, Third Edition, (1987).
Comments to Restatement Section 102 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 40].
7

Id.
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legislative, and executive promulgations of states; diplomatic correspondence; official
statements; votes in international organizations; and military actions.”8 Other sources of
customary international law exist. Professor Scharf states that:
Non-binding resolutions of international conferences or United Nations bodies
(often thought of as soft law) may harden over time into legally binding international
obligations. Treaties that have not yet been ratified by the required number of states to
bring them into force, or which are in force but have not yet been ratified by a particular
state, may nevertheless become binding if they are recognized as customary international
law. Domestic and international judicial and arbitral decisions, as well as the writings of
scholars, provide important evidence of the existence of a new rule of customary
international law.9
B. The Enumerated Crimes of Article 5 of the ECCC Law
1. Murder
Murder is defined as, “the death of the victim resulting from an unlawful act or omission
by the perpetrator.”10
Murder was recognized as crime under customary international law during the period of
1975-1979. This determination is based on sources that fall under two main categories: 1.)
Statutes, Charters, Agreements, Treaties, and Rules; and 2.) Case Law.
(a) The Prohibition of Murder as Evidenced Under Statutes, Charters,
Agreements, Treaties, and Rules
Murder is prohibited under the legal systems of every country on Earth.11 The prohibition
of murder has been understood to be part of customary international law for many years. The

8

Michael Scharf, A Primer on International Law, (2009), at page 2 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
38].
9

Id.

10

Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch, 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, Judgment of July 26, 2010, at paragraph
331[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 21].
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first major evidence of this fact in the international context was in the Agreement for the
Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis (Agreement), and
in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal.12 Under the Agreement, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Soviet Union, the Provisional Government
of France, and the United States acted in the interests of all the United Nations to set up the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT).13 The Charter of the International Military
Tribunal stated under Article 6:
The Tribunal established by the Agreement referred to in Article 1 hereof for the
trial and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis countries shall
have the power to try and punish persons who, in acting in the interests of the European
Axis countries, whether as individuals or as members of organizations, committed any of
the following crimes….
(c) Crimes against humanity – namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation,
and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the
war, or persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds in execution of or in
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in
violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.14
The Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European
Axis, and the Charter of the International Military Tribunal both articulate for the first significant
time, an international outrage against murder. This international outrage was so powerful that
murder was defined as a crime against humanity and tried before the first international tribunal.

11

Steven R. Ratner, Jason S. Abrams, James L. Bischoff, Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in
International Law: Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy, Oxford University Press, (3rd ed. 2009), at page 72 [reproduced
in accompanying notebook at Tab 36].
12

Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals for the European Axis, and Charter
for the International Military Tribunal, August 8, 1945, at page 1 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 2].
13

Id; and Michael Scharf, Supra, at page 12 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 38].
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Charter for the International Military Tribunal, August 8, 1945, at Article 6 [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 2].
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The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) was established less than a
year after the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg.15 The Charter for the IMTFE
virtually matches the IMT’s Charter in terms of the IMTFE’s definition of crimes against
humanity and reaffirms every crime that was contained in Article 6 of the IMT’s Charter
including murder.16
Less than a year after the creation of the IMT and the IMTFE, the United Nations
General Assembly affirmed the principles of international law created by the IMT.17 Resolution
95(I) states that the UN General Assembly “Affirms the principles of international law
recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal…”18 This
resolution reaffirms the prohibition of murder under international law.
After the International Military Tribunal tried the major war criminals, other courts were
created in order to try other war criminals.19 Under Control Council Law No. 10, a new court
was established to prosecute war criminals that were not brought to trial at the IMT.20 Control
Council Law No. 10 was signed by representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France,

15

Charter for the International Military Tribunal of the Far East, 1946, at Article 5 [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 4].
16

Id.

17

Affirmation of the Principles of International Law recognised by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal.
Resolution 95(I) of the United Nations General Assembly (adopted on December 11, 1946), at page 1 [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 1].
18

Id.

19

Control Council Law No. 10: Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace, and Crimes
Against Humanity, December 20, 1945, at Article II(c) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 5].
20

Telford Taylor, Final Report to the Secretary of the Army on the Nuernberg War Crimes Trials Under Control
Council Law No. 10, August 15, 1949; and Control Council Law No. 10: Punishment of Persons Guilty of War
Crimes, Crimes Against Peace, and Crimes Against Humanity, December 20, 1945, at Article II(c) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 41 and 5].
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and the Soviet Union and listed its own definition of crimes against humanity.21 Under Article
II(c) of Control Council Law No. 10, crimes against humanity are defined as, “Atrocities and
offenses, including but not limited to murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation,
imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, or
persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds whether or not in violation of the domestic
laws of the country where perpetrated.”22 Again murder was recognized as a crime prohibited
under international law.
(b) The Prohibition of Murder under the International Tribunals
(1) The International Military Tribunal
The recognition of murder as a crime against humanity under the Charter of the IMT was
backed up and reinforced by the judgments of the Tribunal. In Prosecutor v. Kaltenbrunner,
Kaltenbrunner was found guilty of committing the crime against humanity of murder when, as
head of the Reich Security Head Office, he was involved with the killing of Jews, commissars,
prisoners of war, and others who held views that were considered “ideologically hostile to the
Nazi Regime.”23
In Prosecutor v. Frank, Frank was convicted of committing murder as a crime against
humanity when, as Governor General of the Occupied Polish Territory, he was involved in the
murder of over 3,000,000 Polish Jews.24

21

Control Council Law No. 10: Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace, and Crimes
Against Humanity, December 20, 1945, at Article II(c) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 5].
22

Id.

23

Prosecutor v. Kaltenbrunner, International Military Tribunal [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 22].

24

Prosecutor v. Frank, International Military Tribunal [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 16].
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(2) The ICTY and ICTR
The case law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) are both relevant and applicable to
determining what constituted customary international law during the period of 1975-1979.25
According to the ECCC Trial Court in Prosecutor v. Duch:
The legality Principle does not prevent the Chamber from determining an issue
through a process of interpretation and clarification of the elements of a particular
offense. Nor does it prevent the Chamber from relying on appropriate decisions which
interpret particular ingredients of an offense. Specifically, the Chamber’s reliance on
decisions of international tribunals that post-date January 1979 does not contravene the
principle of legality. Rather, these decisions provide interpretative guidance as regards
the evolving status of certain offenses and forms of responsibility under international
law.26
Professor Michael Scharf presented the argument that the judgments of the ICTY, the ICTR, and
SCSL should all be determinative of the customary international law status of the offenses listed
under Article 5 of the ECCC Law because there had not been a major shift in the interpretations
of crimes against humanity from 1979 to the establishment of the Tribunals.27 Because there
were no international tribunals created between the conclusion of the IMT and the creations of
the ICTY in 1993 and the creation of the ICTR in 1994, there could not have been any major
shifts in the interpretations of what constitutes a crime against humanity in an international
tribunal setting. This argument is evidenced by the reliance on the judgments of the IMT,
IMTFE, and Control Council Law No. 10 in the judgments of both the ICTY and ICTR. When
citing precedent to prosecute crimes against humanity, the ICTY and ICTR both draw their
source of prosecution from these early tribunals. Cases in which the tribunals rely on the
25

Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch, at para. 34 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 21].

26

Id.

27

This argument was presented to this writer in a meeting with Professor Scharf.
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judgments of the IMT, IMTFE, and/or Control Council Law No. 10 include but are not limited
to: Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, and Prosecutor v.
Delalic.28
The prohibition of murder under customary international law has been recognized in
multiple cases.29 One of the leading cases in international law on the subject of the customary
international law status of murder is Prosecutor v. Akayesu. In Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Jean Paul
Akayesu was convicted of committing murder as a crime against humanity when he was
complicit in the killing of Tutsi civilians in the commune in which he was a bourgmestre.30
When the Tribunal addressed the issue of whether Akayesu could be convicted of murder as a
crime against humanity, they stated clearly and concisely that Akayesu could, in fact, be
convicted of murder as a crime against humanity.31 In making that decision, the Tribunal held
that:
The Chamber considers that murder is a crime against humanity…The
International Law Commission discussed the inhumane act of murder in the context of
the definition of crimes against humanity and concluded that the crime of murder is
clearly understood and defined in the national law of every state and therefore there is no
need to further explain this prohibited act.32
The ICTR considered the evidence for the prohibition of murder under customary international
law to be so strong and so well understood that they need not spend any great length of time in
its discussion. This holding was strengthened even more when the ECCC in the Duch opinion
28

Prosecutor v. Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment of Dec. 10, 1998; Prosecutor v. Kunarac, IT-96-23-T,
Judgment of Feb. 22, 2001; Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, IT-98-32-T, Judgment of Nov. 29, 2002; and Prosecutor v.
Delalic, IT-96-21-T, Judgment of Nov. 16, 1998 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tabs 19, 26, 33, and 15].
29

Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, IT-98-32-T, Judgment of Nov. 29, 2002; and Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4,
Decision September 2, 1998 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tabs 15 and 14].
30

Prosecutor v. Akayesu, at para. 12 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 14].

31

Id at para. 587.

32

Id.
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held that the determination on the customary international law of murder held by the ICTR in the
Akayesu judgment is determinative on the customary international law status of murder in the
period of 1975-1979.33
(3) The ECCC
The ECCC trial chamber held in Prosecutor v. Duch that murder is, “a well-established
crime under customary international law.”34
(c) Conclusion
The prohibition of murder was part of customary international law during the period of
1975-1979. The prohibition of murder meets both of the state practice requirement and the
opinio juris requirement necessary for it to be considered part of customary international law.
The prohibition of murder can be considered a widespread practice of states because
murder is outlawed under every legal system on Earth, and it has been considered as a crime
against humanity by the United Nations and the major allied powers as early as 1945.35 The
prohibition of murder can be considered opinio juris because states feel an obligation to
prosecute perpetrators. This is evidenced by the prosecution of murder as a crime in the national
courts of every country in the world, and by the prosecution of murder on the international stage
in the IMT, the IMTFE, Control Council Law No. 10, the ICTY, the ICTR, the SCSL, and the
ECCC in the Duch judgment.
33
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2. Extermination
Extermination is defined as, “An act, omission, or combination of each that results in the
death of persons on a massive scale.”36
Extermination was recognized as crime under customary international law during the
period of 1975-1979. This determination is based on statutes, charters, agreements, treaties,
rules, and case law.
(a) The Prohibition of Extermination under Statutes, Charters, Agreements,
Treaties, and Rules
The prohibition of extermination under customary international law was first evidenced
under the Charter of the International Military Tribunal in 1945.37 Extermination was one of the
enumerated offenses that constituted a crime against humanity under Article 6(c) of the IMT
Charter.38
Extermination was also enumerated as a crime against humanity in 1945 and in 1946
under Control Council Law No. 10 and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East,
respectively.39
(b) The Prohibition of Extermination under the International Tribunals
(1) The International Military Tribunal
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Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch, at para. 334 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 21].
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Far East, 1946, at Article 5 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tabs 5 and 4].

21

The recognition of the offense of extermination as a crime against humanity first took
place in the Charter of the IMT and in the judgments rendered under the Charter by the Tribunal.
One case in which the Tribunal found the defendant guilty for his actions in relation to a program
of extermination is in Prosecutor v. Kaltenbrunner. Kaltenbrunner was found guilty of having
committed extermination when, as head of the RHSA, he was integral to the killings of over
3,000,000 Polish Jews.40 The Tribunal stated:
A special section under the Amt IV of the RHSA was established to supervise this
program [the extermination of the Jews]. Under its direction, approximately six million
Jews were murdered, of which two million were killed by Einsatzgruppen and other units
of the Security Police. Kaltenbrunner had been informed of the activities of these
Einsatzgruppen when he was a Higher SS and Police Leader, and they continued to
function after he had become chief of the RHSA.41
The Tribunal held that “The RHSA played a leading part in the “final solution” of the Jewish
question by extermination of the Jews.”42 This case clearly demonstrates the IMT’s reaffirmation
that extermination was a crime against humanity in 1945.
(2) The ICTY
The prohibition of extermination under customary international law was reaffirmed again
under the judgments of both the ICTY and the ICTR. One of the leading cases dealing with
extermination is Prosecutor v. Kristic, decided by the ICTY. In this case, Radislav Kristic was
convicted of committing extermination when Kristic was responsible for the mass killings of
Bosnian Muslim males of military age in the aftermath of the fall of Srebrenica.43 The Tribunal
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goes on to explain that the prohibition of extermination under customary international law is
widely accepted.44 The Tribunal states, “Extermination is also widely recognized as a crime
against humanity in many international and national instruments.”45 Just as in the Akayesu
analysis, the Tribunal felt that the prohibition on extermination is so widely accepted and
understood, that a detailed analysis of its development in customary international law was
unnecessary. And also like Akayesu, the holding in this case that extermination was
unequivocally part of customary international law was affirmed by the ECCC in the Duch
Judgment.
(3) The ECCC
The ECCC held that the prohibition of extermination is widely accepted as part of
customary international law. In Prosecutor v. Duch, the Court held that the customary status of
extermination, for the period of 1975-1979, was “undisputed.”46 The court cited the Kristic
analysis listed above in its determination that the prohibition of extermination was part of
customary international law.47
(c) Conclusion
The prohibition of extermination is clearly part of customary international law, and was
so prior to 1975. The prohibition of extermination meets both the state practice requirement and
the opinio juris requirement necessary for it to be considered part of customary international law.

44

Id at para 492.

45

Id.

46

Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch, at para. 334 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 21].

47

Id.

23

The prohibition of extermination can be considered a widespread practice of states
because it is recognized as a crime against humanity under numerous international and national
legal systems and agreements, and it has been considered as a crime against humanity by the
United Nations and the major allied powers as early as 1945.48 The prohibition of extermination
can be considered opinio juris because states feel an obligation to prosecute the occurrence of
extermination. This is evidenced by the prosecution of extermination as a crime on the
international stage in the IMT, the IMTFE, Control Council Law No. 10, the ICTY, the ICTR,
the SCSL, and the ECCC.
3. Enslavement
Enslavement is defined as, “The exercise of any or all powers attaching to the rights of
ownership over a person. Indicia of enslavement include ‘control of someone’s movement,
control of physical environment, psychological control, measures taken to prevent or deter
escape, force, threat of force or coercion, duration, assertion of exclusivity, subjection to cruel
treatment and abuse, control of sexuality, and forced labor.’”49
Enslavement was recognized as a crime under customary international law during the
period of 1975-1979.
(a) The Prohibition of Enslavement under Statutes, Charters, Agreements,
Treaties, and Rules
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The prohibition of enslavement under customary international law was first evidenced
under the Charter of the International Military Tribunal in 1945.50 Enslavement was one of the
enumerated offenses that constituted a crime against humanity under Article 6(c) of the IMT
Charter.51
Enslavement was also enumerated as a crime against humanity in 1945 and in 1946 under
Control Council Law No. 10 and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East,
respectively.52
In 1948 the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. In this document, the UNGA proclaimed an international standard
for behavior with respect to the rights of people everywhere.53 The Universal Declaration states:
The General Assembly, Proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights as
a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every
individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall
strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by
progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective
recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and
among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.54
The UNGA goes on to state unequivocally, that enslavement is forbidden.55 Under Article 4 of
the Declaration, “No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be
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prohibited in all their forms.”56 This declaration reaffirms the principles of the IMT, IMTFE, and
Control Council Law No. 10, and reaffirms the belief that enslavement as a crime against
humanity is understood as part of customary international law.
On September 3, 1953, Article 4 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was
reaffirmed by the entering into force of the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Under Article 4 of this Convention, “1. No one shall be held
in slavery or servitude. 2. No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labor.”57
Although Cambodia was obviously not a party to this convention due to the fact that this
convention was limited only to the countries of Europe, the convention nonetheless emphasizes
the majority viewpoint of the international community that the prohibition of enslavement is
understood to be part of customary international law.
On March 23, 1976, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
entered into force.58 Under Article 8 of the Covenant, “1. No one shall be held in slavery; slavery
and the slave-trade in all of their forms shall be prohibited. 2. No one shall be held in servitude.
3.(a) No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labor.”59 This covenant again
strengthens the international view the enslavement is prohibited under customary international
law.
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On July 18, 1978, the American Convention on Human Rights entered into force.60 Under
Article 6 of this convention, “1. No one shall be subject to slavery or to involuntary servitude,
which are prohibited in all their forms, as are the slave trade and traffic in women. 2. No one
shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labor.”61
Any one of these international instruments, taken alone, might not necessarily show that
enslavement is prohibited, but taken together; they establish the international attitude that
enslavement is prohibited under international law.
(b) The Prohibition of Enslavement under the International Tribunals
(1) The International Military Tribunal
The IMT recognized that enslavement constituted a crime against humanity in the IMT
Charter.62 The IMT strengthened this prohibition in its judgments. In Prosecutor v. Sauckel, the
Tribunal found Sauckel guilty of crimes against humanity when Sauckel was found to have had
overall responsibility for the slave labor program in Germany.63
In Prosecutor v. Frick, the Tribunal convicted Frick of crimes against humanity when it
found that Frick, as Supreme Reich Authority in Bohemia and Moravia, allowed the slave labor
program to continue in the territory under his control.64
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In Prosecutor v. Goering, the Tribunal convicted Goering of crimes against humanity for
issuing orders directing prisoners of war to be used as slave laborers and for demanding that
Himmler move slave laborers into his aircraft factories.65
All of these judgments reinforced the understanding that by the end of the 1940s,
enslavement was understood and accepted to be a crime against humanity.
(2) The ICTY
The prohibition against enslavement was again affirmed to be part of customary
international law in Prosecutor v. Krnojelac. In this case the Tribunal held that, “the Trial
Chamber is satisfied that the prohibition against slavery is customary in nature.”66
The prohibition of enslavement was confirmed again in Prosecutor v. Kunarac. In this
case the Tribunal also held that enslavement is part of customary international law.67 In making
this determination, the Tribunal found the prohibition of enslavement to be evidenced in the
following: the 1926 Slavery Convention, the 1956 Supplemental Slavery Convention, the 1930
Forced and Compulsory Labor Convention, the 1957 Convention Concerning the Abolition of
Forced Labor, the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, the Charter for the International
Military Tribunal for the Far East, the Allied Control Council Law No. 10, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the

65

Prosecutor v. Goering, International Military Tribunal [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 20].

66

Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, IT-97-25-T, Judgment of March 12, 2002, at para. 353 [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 25].
67

Prosecutor v. Kunarac, IT-96-23-T, Judgment of Feb. 22, 2001, at para. 539 [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 26].

28

European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and the American
Convention on Human Rights.68
(3) The ECCC
The ECCC has also held that enslavement constitutes a crime against humanity and was
part of customary international law during the period of 1975-1979. In Prosecutor v. Duch, the
court held that, “The prohibition against slavery is unambiguously part of customary
international law.”69 Again, as with murder and extermination, the court felt that the prohibition
against enslavement was so clear and unambiguous that it did not necessitate a lengthy or
detailed analysis.
(c) Conclusion
The prohibition of enslavement was part of customary international law during the period
of 1975-1979. The prohibition of enslavement can be considered part of the widespread practice
of states because the Charters of the IMT and IMTFE, Control Council Law No. 10, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and
the American Convention on Human Rights all demonstrate a continuous commitment to
outlawing and prohibiting enslavement. The prohibition of enslavement meets the opinio juris
requirement because starting with the IMT in 1945 and continuing through the International
Tribunals of the present, the international community has demonstrated a fundamental
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determination to prosecute the crime of enslavement wherever and whenever it occurs. M. Cherif
Bassiouni70 shares this conclusion. He states:
It is well established that prohibitions against slavery and slave-related practices have
achieved the level of customary international law and have achieved jus cogens status.
An array of conventions and treaties, both multilateral and bilateral in nature, contain
these prohibitions and proscribe such practices in times of war and during peace.71
4. Deportation
Deportation is defined as, “The forced removal of a population from its home state to
another state.”72 Deportation was recognized as a crime against humanity and was part of
customary international law during the period of 1975-1979. This is evidenced by the prohibition
of deportation in numerous international instruments and through the judgments of the IMT and
the ICTY.
(a) The Prohibition of Deportation under Statutes, Charters, Agreements,
Treaties, and Rules
The prohibition of deportation is recognized under numerous international instruments.
Deportation was explicitly listed as a crime against humanity under the Charter for the IMT, the
Charter for the IMTFE, and Control Council Law No. 10.73
Article 49(1) of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Times of War (IV) states, “Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of
70
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protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of
any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive.”74 Cambodia
ratified the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, on August 12, 1958, a full seventeen years
before the period of 1975-1979.75 The Geneva Conventions have been ratified by over 190
countries.76 This clearly demonstrates the customary international law status of this Convention
in that over 190 countries have chosen to recognize the prohibitions contained in the
conventions.
Under Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, “1. Everyone has the
right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each State. 2. Everyone has
the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.”77 Although this
Article does not explicitly prohibit the act of deportation, the act of forcibly deporting someone
from his or her home state infringes on this recognized right of residence in one’s own country.
Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states, “1. Everyone
lawfully within the territory of a state shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of
movement, and freedom to choose his residence. 2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country,
including his own…4. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own
country.”78 This article demonstrates the international community’s abhorrence to the act of the
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forced deportation of individuals from their home state. Although the Article does not
specifically list the word “deportation,” the Article nonetheless prohibits the actions of forcible
deportation even if does not use the word deportation to describe those actions.79
All of these international instruments taken together show a continuous prohibition on
forcible deportation, and recognize that forcible deportation is prohibited under customary
international law.
(b) The Prohibition of Deportation under the International Tribunals
(1) The International Military Tribunal
The classification of forcible deportation as a crime against humanity in the Charter of
the IMT was reaffirmed by the judgments of the Tribunal. In Prosecutor v. von Schirach, the
Tribunal found von Schirach guilty of committing crimes against humanity when von Schirach,
as Gauleiter of Vienna, deported 60,000 Jews from Vienna, Austria.80 The Tribunal held, “The
Tribunal finds that von Schirach, while he did not originate the policy of deporting Jews from
Vienna, participated in this deportation after he had become Gualeiter of Vienna. He knew that
the best the Jews could hope for was a miserable existence in the Ghettoes of the East. Bulletins
describing the Jewish extermination were in his office.”81
Other judgments of the Tribunal demonstrate the prohibition of forcible deportation. In
Prosecutor v. Frank, the Tribunal found Frank guilty of crimes against humanity when Frank, as
the Governor General of the Occupied Polish Territory, deported thousands of Poles, as slave
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laborers, to Germany.82 In Prosecutor v. Frick, Frick was convicted of crimes against humanity
for his actions in deporting Jews to the concentration camps for the purpose of extermination.83
And, in Prosecutor v. Sauckel, Sauckel was convicted of crimes against humanity for his
participation in the deportation of millions of people.84 The court held that, “The evidence shows
that Sauckel was in charge of a program which involved deportation for slave labour of more
than 5,000,000 human beings, many of them under terrible conditions of cruelty and suffering.”85
(2) The ICTY
The ICTY reaffirmed the prosecution of deportation as a crime against humanity and
prohibited under customary international law. In Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, the Tribunal held that
deportation as a crime against humanity was recognized as part of customary international law.86.
In its judgment, the Tribunal held, “Deportation is clearly prohibited under international
humanitarian law. While some instruments prohibit deportation as a war crime, it is also
prohibited specifically as a crime against humanity, and it is enumerated as such under the
Statute.”87 The Tribunal continues, “Deportation was originally prohibited as a crime against
humanity in order to extend the jurisdiction of the Second World War tribunals to encompass
acts committed against persons sharing the same nationality as the principle offenders. The
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content of the underlying offense, however, does not differ whether perpetrated as a war crime or
as a crime against humanity.”88
(c) Conclusion
Deportation was clearly understood to be prohibited under international law during the
period of 1975-1979. The prohibition of forcible deportation was part of the widespread practice
of states during 1975-1979. This is evidenced by the Charters of the IMT and the IMTFE,
Control Council Law No.10, Article 49 of the Geneva Conventions IV, Article 13 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights. The prohibition of forcible deportation meets the opinio juris requirement
because states have felt a legal obligation to prosecute forcible deportation throughout the last 65
years. The international community has prosecuted forcible deportation as a war crime and crime
against humanity in the IMT, the IMTFE, Control Council Law No. 10, the ICTY, the ICTR, and
the SCSL.
5. Imprisonment
Imprisonment refers to “The arbitrary deprivation of an individual’s liberty without due
process of law.”89 The prohibition on arbitrary imprisonment was part of customary international
law during the period of 1975-1979. This is evidenced by numerous international agreements and
instruments, and by the judgments of the international tribunals.
(a) The Prohibition of Imprisonment under Statutes, Charters, Agreements,
Treaties, and Rules
88
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The customary international law status of the prohibition of arbitrary imprisonment can
be determined through the analysis of numerous international instruments. Although arbitrary
imprisonment was not listed as a crime against humanity in the IMT Charter or the IMTFE
Charter, it was explicitly listed a crime under Control Council Law No. 10.90
Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that, “No one shall be
subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.”91
Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that,
“Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.” No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in
accordance with such procedures as are established by law.”92
Article 5 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms states that, “Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No
one shall be deprived of his liberty…”93
Article 7(3) of the American Convention on Human Rights states that, “No one shall be
subject to arbitrary arrest or imprisonment.”94
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Articles 42 and 43 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War (IV) also outlaws arbitrary imprisonment.95
Although individually these instruments might not prove that arbitrary imprisonment is
prohibited under customary international law, all of these international instruments, taken
together, demonstrate the international community’s understanding that arbitrary imprisonment
is in fact prohibited under customary international law. The fact that the bringing into force of
these instruments spans a time frame of over 30 years also demonstrates the understanding that
the prohibition of arbitrary imprisonment under customary international law is ongoing and
continuous.
(b) The Prohibition of Imprisonment under the International Tribunals
(1) Control Council Law No. 10
Under Control Council Law No. 10, defendants were convicted of the crime against
humanity of imprisonment. One such group of defendants was the defendants in Prosecutor v.
Pohl. In this case, the Tribunal found a majority of the defendants guilty of committing the crime
against humanity of imprisonment, when as members of the WVHA (one of the twelve main
departments of the SS), they were responsible for the administration of the concentration camps
and of the concentration camp inmates.96
(2) The ICTY
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The ICTY has also recognized the prohibition of arbitrary imprisonment as a crime
against humanity. The Tribunal prosecuted the crime against humanity of imprisonment for the
first time in Prosecutor v. Kordic, and concluded that Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez were
guilty of arbitrarily imprisoning Bosnian Muslims.97
The ICTY expanded this determination in Prosecutor v. Krnojelac. In Prosecutor v.
Krnojelac, the Tribunal held that arbitrary imprisonment constituted a crime against humanity.98
In making their judgment the Tribunal found certain instruments persuasive.99 The Tribunal
stated:
The Charters of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals did not specify
imprisonment as a crime, but it was defined as a crime against humanity in Article II(c)
of Control Council Law No. 10. The right of an individual not to be deprived of his or her
liberty arbitrarily is also enshrined in a number of human rights instruments, both
international and regional.100
These instruments that the Tribunal points to in finding that arbitrary imprisonment must be
considered a crime against humanity are: Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, Article 9 of the ICCPR, Article 5 of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights, and Article 7 of the American Convention on Human Rights.101 The analysis of
the Tribunal in this case clearly demonstrates that imprisonment was understood to be a crime
against humanity in 1945 with the passing of Control Council Law No.10, and has continued to
be regarded as prohibited under the numerous international instruments that were created prior to
the decision of the ICTY in this case.
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(3) The ECCC
The ECCC has held that imprisonment was considered a crime against humanity in 1975
and was part of customary international law.102 In Prosecutor v. “Duch,” the court held, “The
customary status of the prohibition of arbitrary imprisonment under international law initially
developed from the laws of war and is supported by human rights instruments.”103 The court
goes on to hold that the defendant was guilty of intentionally and arbitrarily imprisoning
thousands of detainees.104 In support of their conclusion that imprisonment constituted a crime
against humanity for the period of 1975 to 1979, the court noted that the judgments of the ICTY
in both Prosecutor v. Kordic and Prosecutor v. Krnojelac were persuasive.105
(c) Conclusion
Arbitrary imprisonment was prohibited under international law during the period of
1975-1979. The prohibition of arbitrary imprisonment was part of the widespread practice of
states during 1975-1979. This is evidenced by Control Council Law No.10, Articles 42 and 43 of
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Article 9 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Article 5 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, and Article 7(3) of the American Convention on Human Rights. The
prohibition of arbitrary imprisonment meets the opinio juris requirement because states have felt
a legal obligation to prosecute arbitrary imprisonment throughout the last 65 years. The
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international community has prosecuted arbitrary imprisonment as a crime against humanity in
Control Council Law No. 10, the ICTY, the ICTR, the SCSL, and the ECCC.
6. Torture
Torture is defined as, “The infliction, by an act or omission, of severe pain or suffering,
whether physical or mental.”106 The Prohibition of torture was part of customary international
law during the period of 1975-1979. This is evidenced through Control Council Law No. 10, the
Geneva Conventions, multiple international agreements prohibiting torture, and the judgments of
the international tribunals.
(a) The Prohibition of Torture under Statutes, Charters, Agreements, Treaties,
and Rules
While the Charters of the IMT and IMTFE do not explicitly list torture as a crime against
humanity, it was listed as a crime against humanity under Control Council Law No. 10.107
Tedford Taylor108 wrote in his report on Control Council Law No. 10 to the Secretary of the
Army that, “the provisions of the London Charter and Control Council Law No.10 closely
parallel each other, and the underlying principles are identical. The first trial [Nuremberg] and
the 12 following trials [Control Council Law No. 10], therefore, form a single sequence based on
common principles.”109
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Under Article 31 of Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War (IV), “No physical or moral coercion shall be exercised against protected persons,
particularly to obtain information from them or from third parties.”110 Under Article 32:
The High Contracting Parties specifically agree that each of them is prohibited
from taking any measures of such a character as to cause the physical suffering or
extermination of protected persons in their hands. This prohibition applies not only to
murder, torture, corporal punishments, mutilation and medical or scientific experiments
not necessitated by the medical treatment of a protected person, but also to any other
measures of brutality whether applied by civilian or military agents.111
Torture is prohibited under Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It
states, “No one shall be subjected to torture, or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.”112
Torture is also prohibited under Article 7 of the ICCPR. It states, “No one shall be
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”113
In 1975 the UNGA passed resolution 3452, the Declaration on the Protection of all
Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.114 Under Article 2 of this resolution, “Any act of torture or other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment is an offense to human dignity and shall be condemned as a
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denial of the purpose of the Charter of the United Nations and as a violation of the of the human
rights and fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”115
In 1987, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment entered into force.116 One hundred and forty-four countries are parties
to this convention.117 This convention reaffirms the principles of the Declaration on the
Protection of all Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and adds in more prohibitions in order to better prohibit the
occurrence of torture around the world.118
All of these international instruments demonstrate that torture was clearly prohibited
under customary international law during the period of 1975-1979.
(b) The Prohibition of Torture in the International Tribunals
(1) The ICTY
The ICTY has held that torture is a crime against humanity and its prohibition is part of
customary international law.119 In Prosecutor v. Furudzija, the Tribunal addressed whether
torture was part of customary international law. The Tribunal held, “The proposition is warranted
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that a general prohibition against torture has evolved in customary international law.”120 The
Tribunal continues by holding:
Torture was not specifically mentioned in the London Agreement of 8 August
1945 establishing the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, hereafter “London
Agreement”, but it was one of the acts expressly classified as a crime against humanity
under article II(1)(c) of Allied Control Council Law No. 10, hereafter “Control Council
Law No.10.” As stated above, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Protocols of 1977
prohibit torture in terms.
That these treaty provisions have ripened into customary rules is evinced by
various factors. First, these treaties and in particular the Geneva Conventions have been
ratified by practically all States of the world. Admittedly those treaty provisions remain
as such and any contracting party is formally entitled to relieve itself of its obligations by
denouncing the treaty (an occurrence that seems extremely unlikely in reality);
nevertheless the practically universal participation in these treaties shows that all States
accept among other things the prohibition of torture. Secondly, no State has ever claimed
that it was authorised to practice torture in time of armed conflict, nor has any State
shown or manifested opposition to the implementation of treaty provisions against
torture. When a State has been taken to task because its officials allegedly resorted to
torture, it has normally responded that the allegation was unfounded, thus expressly or
implicitly upholding the prohibition of this odious practice.121
The Tribunal concludes by holding, “It therefore seems incontrovertible that torture in time of
armed conflict is prohibited by a general rule of international law.122
The ICTY reaffirms the belief that torture is prohibited under customary international law
in Prosecutor v. Delalic. In this case, the Tribunal holds that, “There can be no doubt that torture
is prohibited by both conventional and customary international law.”123
(2) The ECCC
The ECCC has held that torture was part of customary international law during the period
of 1975-1979. In Prosecutor v. “Duch,” the court held, “The prohibition on torture has acquired
120
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the status of a peremptory or non-derogable principle of international law.”124 In determining this
question, the court held:
The crime of torture is proscribed and defined by numerous international
instruments, including the 1975 United Nations General Assembly Declaration on
Torture, adopted by consensus, and the 1984 Convention against Torture. The definition
in the 1984 Convention against Torture, which closely mirrors that of the 1975 General
Assembly Declaration, has been accepted by the ICTY as being declaratory of customary
international law. The Chamber accordingly finds that this definition had in substance
been accepted as customary by 1975.125
(c) Conclusion
Torture was clearly understood as prohibited under customary international law during
the period of 1975-1979. The prohibition of torture was part of the widespread practice of states
during 1975-1979. This is evidenced by Control Council Law No.10, Articles 31 and 32 of
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Article 5 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Article 2 of the Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Being
Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
The prohibition of torture meets the opinio juris requirement because states have felt a legal
obligation to prosecute torture in multiple international tribunals. The international community
has prosecuted and punished torture as a crime against humanity in Control Council Law No. 10,
the ICTY, the ICTR, the SCSL, and the ECCC.
7. Rape
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Rape is defined as, “The sexual penetration, however slight of the vagina or anus of the
victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any other object used by the perpetrator; or the mouth of
the victim by the penis of the perpetrator, where such sexual penetration occurs without the
consent of the victim.”126 Rape was prohibited under customary international law during the
period of 1975-1979.
(a) The Prohibition of Rape under Statutes, Charters, Agreements, Treaties, and
Rules
Rape was prohibited as early as 1863.127 Under Article 44 of the Instructions for the
Government of Armies of the United States in the Field (Lieber Code), “All wanton violence
committed against persons in the invaded country, all destruction of property not commanded by
the authorized officer, all robbery, all pillage or sacking, even after taking a place by main force,
all rape, wounding, maiming, or killing of such inhabitants, are prohibited under the penalty of
death, or such other severe punishment as may seem adequate for the gravity of the offense.”128
Although this code is outdated and applied only to the U.S. Army, it demonstrates the fact that
there was a prominent view that rape was a war crime and should be punished as such.
Although rape was not enumerated as a crime against humanity in the Charters of the
IMT or IMTFE, it was enumerated as a crime against humanity under Control Council Law No.
10.129 M. Cherrif Bassiouni argues that even though rape was not explicitly listed in the Charters
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of the IMT or IMTFE, “Both Charters contained the term “inhumane treatment.” Under general
principles of law, rape and sexual assault clearly constitute inhumane treatment.”130
Rape was explicitly prohibited under the Geneva Conventions.131 Under Article 27 of the
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (IV), “Women
shall be especially protected against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape,
enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault.”132 According to Kelly D. Askin133 “There
is now a broad consensus that serious violations of the Geneva Conventions can carry criminal
liability and be punished as crimes of war.”134
(b) The Prohibition of Rape in the International Tribunals
(1) The ICTY
The ICTY has held that rape is prohibited under customary international law, and that it
constitutes a crime against humanity.135 In Prosecutor v. Furundzija, the Tribunal directly
addressed the customary international law status of rape. The Tribunal held, “The prohibition of
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rape and serious sexual assault in armed conflict has also evolved in customary international
law.”136The Tribunal continues holding,
While rape and sexual assaults were not specifically prosecuted by the Nuremberg
Tribunal, rape was expressly classified as a crime against humanity under article II(1)(c)
of Control Council Law No. 10. The Tokyo International Military Tribunal convicted
Generals Toyoda and Matsui of command responsibility for violations of the laws or
customs of war committed by their soldiers in Nanking, which included widespread rapes
and sexual assaults. The former Foreign Minister of Japan, Hirota, was also convicted for
these atrocities. This decision and that of the United Military Commission in Yamashita,
along with the ripening of the fundamental prohibition of “outrages upon personal
dignity” laid down in common article 3 into customary international law, has contributed
to the evolution of universally accepted norms of international law prohibiting rape as
well as serious sexual assault. These norms are applicable in any armed conflict. It is
indisputable that rape and other serious sexual assaults in armed conflict entail criminal
liability of the perpetrators.137
In Prosecutor v. Delalic, the Tribunal holds, “There can be no doubt that rape and other forms of
sexual assault are expressly prohibited under international humanitarian law.”138
(2) The ECCC
The ECCC has held that rape constitutes a crime against humanity and that it was
prohibited under customary international law during the period of 1975-1979.139 In Prosecutor v.
“Duch,” the Chambers held that, “Rape has long been prohibited under customary international
law.”140
(c) Conclusion
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The prohibition of rape was understood to be part of customary international law during
the period of 1975-1979. The prohibition of rape was part of the widespread practice of states
during 1975-1979. This is evidenced by Article 44 of the Lieber Code, Control Council Law
No.10, and Article 27 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War (IV). The prohibition of rape meets the opinio juris requirement because states have
felt a legal obligation to prosecute rape in multiple international tribunals. The international
community has prosecuted and punished rape as a crime against humanity in Control Council
Law No. 10, the ICTY, the ICTR, the SCSL, and the ECCC.
8. Persecution on Political, Racial, or Religious Grounds
The prohibition of persecution on political, racial, or religious grounds was part of
customary international law during the period of 1975-1979. Persecution on political, racial, or
religious grounds is defined as, “large-scale and discriminatory offending in situations involving
massive criminality but which may not entail the necessary physical destruction or exterminatory
intent required for genocide.”141
(a) The Prohibition of Persecution on Political, Racial, or Religious Grounds
under Statutes, Charters, Agreements, Treaties, and Rules
The prohibition of persecution on political, racial, or religious grounds was evidenced by
the Charters of both the IMT and the IMTFE, and by Control Council Law No. 10.142 All three of
these instruments specifically enumerated the crime of persecution on political, racial, or
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religious grounds as a crime against humanity.143 Persecutions on political, racial, or religious
grounds are clearly understood to be a crime against humanity.
(b) The Prohibition of Persecution on Political, Racial or Religious Grounds in
the International Tribunals
(1) The International Military Tribunal
The International Military Tribunal reaffirmed the prohibition of persecution on political,
racial, or religious grounds through the judgments of the Tribunal. In Prosecutor v. Goering, the
Tribunal found Goering guilty of persecution on religious grounds for Goering’s actions in
persecuting the Jews in Europe.144 The Tribunal held, “Goering persecuted the Jews, particularly
after the November, 1938 riots, and not only in Germany where he raised the billion mark fine
as; stated elsewhere, but in the conquered territories as well.”145
In Prosecutor v. Streicher, the Tribunal found that Streicher committed persecution on
religious grounds when, through his speeches and articles, he preached the persecution of the
Jews.146 The Tribunal held that he, “incited the German people to active persecution.”147
(2) The ICTY
The ICTY has held that persecution on political, racial, and religious grounds constitutes
a crime against humanity.148 In Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, the ICTY held that persecution on
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political, racial, or religious grounds is part of customary international law.149 The Tribunal held
that persecution can consist of acts enumerated in article 5, but persecution can also consist of
acts not enumerated under crimes against humanity or anywhere else in the ICTY statute.150 In
Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, the Tribunal held that any act may be charged as a persecution, even
acts not listed in the ICTY Statute but, “Such acts or omissions must reach the same level of
gravity as the other crimes against humanity enumerated in Article 5 of the Statute.”151 By this
analysis, it appears that the prohibition of persecution on political, racial, or religious grounds is
understood to be part of customary international law.
(3) The ECCC
The ECCC has held that persecution constituted a crime against humanity during the
period of 1975-1979.152 In Prosecutor v. “Duch,” the Chambers held, “Persecution has long been
proscribed as a crime under customary international law.”153 In making this determination, the
court pointed to the Charter of the IMT, the Charter of IMTFE, and Control Council Law No. 10
as being evidence of the customary international law nature of persecution.154
(c) Conclusion
The prohibition of persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds was part of
customary international law during the period of 1975-1979. The Charter of the International
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Military Tribunal, the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, and Control
Council Law No. 10 all evidence the fact that the prohibition of persecutions on political, racial,
or religious grounds was part of the widespread practice of states. The prosecution and
punishment of persecution on political, racial, or religious grounds by the IMT, the IMTFE,
Control Council Law No. 10, the ICTY, the ICTR, and the ECCC all demonstrate that this
prohibition is opinio juris. With both requirements met, the prohibition of persecutions on
political, racial, or religious grounds must have been part of customary international law during
the period of 1975-1979.
9. Other Inhumane Acts
The prohibition of other inhumane acts was part of customary international law during
the period of 1975-1979. Other inhumane acts are defined as a, “residual offense which is
intended to criminalise conduct which meets the criteria of a crime against humanity but does not
fit within one of the other underlying crimes. The act must be ‘sufficiently similar in gravity to
the other enumerated crimes’ to constitute an inhumane act.”155
(a) The Prohibition of Other Inhumane Acts under Statutes, Charters,
Agreements, Treaties, and Rules
The prohibition of other inhumane acts in customary international law was evidenced by
the Charters of both the IMT and the IMTFE, and by Control Council Law No. 10.156 All three of
these instruments specifically enumerated the crime of other inhumane acts as crimes against

155

Id at para. 367.

156

Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Article 6; Control Council Law No. 10: Punishment of Persons
Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace, and Crimes Against Humanity, December 20, 1945, at Article II(c);
and Charter for the International Military Tribunal of the Far East, 1946, at Article 5. [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tabs 2, 5, and 4].

50

humanity.157 Other inhumane acts were clearly understood to be crimes against humanity in
1945.
(b) The Prohibition of Other Inhumane Acts in the International Tribunals
(1) The ICTY
The prohibition of other inhumane acts was reaffirmed by the ICTY. In Prosecutor v.
Delalic, the Tribunal held that, “As with torture, there can be no doubt that inhuman treatment is
prohibited under conventional and customary international law.”158 The Tribunal expanded on
this holding in Prosecutor v. Kordic. In Kordic, the Tribunal holds:
It is not controversial that the category “other inhumane acts” provided for in
Article 5 is a residual category, which encompasses acts not specifically enumerated.
Trial Chambers have considered the threshold to be reached by these other acts in order
to be incorporated in this category, reaching similar conclusions as to the serious nature
of these acts.159
The Tribunal continues:
Acts such as “mutilation and other types of severe bodily harm,” “beatings and
other acts of violence,” and “serious physical and mental injury” have been considered as
constituting inhumane acts. The Trial Chamber in Kupreskic took a broader approach of
which acts may fall into the category of other inhumane acts in concluding that acts such
as the forcible transfer of groups of civilians, enforced prostitution, and the enforced
disappearance of persons may be regarded as “other inhumane acts.”160
The Tribunal is essentially holding that offenses are recognized as “other inhumane acts” when
they are as serious as the rest of the enumerated crimes against humanity, but are not otherwise
specifically enumerated as a crime against humanity.
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(2) The ECCC
The ECCC has held that the prohibition on other inhumane acts was part of customary
international law during the period of 1975-1979.161 In Prosecutor v. “Duch,” the Chambers
held, “The customary status of this crime [other inhumane acts] is also well established.”162 The
Chambers continues, “For an inhumane act to be established, it must be proved that the victim
suffered serious harm to the body or mind, and that the suffering was the result of an act or
omission of the perpetrator.”163 The Chambers goes on to hold, “Examples of inhumane acts
which have been found to constitute crimes against humanity include forcible displacement and
forcible transfer, severe bodily harm, detention in brutal and deplorable living conditions, as well
as beatings and other acts of violence.”164 The Chambers seems to be suggesting that because the
crime of “other inhumane acts” was established as part of customary international law by the
1975, any offense found to constitute an inhumane act under the analysis the court utilizes, is
part of customary international law during the period of 1975-1979 as well.
(c) Conclusion
The prohibition of other inhumane acts was part of customary international law during
the period of 1975-1979. The Charter of the International Military Tribunal, the Charter of the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East, and Control Council Law No. 10 all evidence the
fact that the prohibition of other inhumane acts was part of the widespread practice of states. The
prosecution and punishment of other inhumane acts by the IMT, the IMTFE, Control Council
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Law No. 10, the ICTY, the ICTR, and the ECCC all demonstrate that this prohibition is opinio
juris. With both requirements met, the prohibition of other inhumane acts must have been part of
customary international law during the period of 1975-1979.
C. The Enumerated Crimes against Humanity listed Under Article 5 of ECCC Law are
Prosecutable Under Article 5 of the ECCC Law.
The enumerated crimes against humanity listed under Article 5 of ECCC Law, namely
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, persecutions on
political, racial, or religious grounds, and other inhumane acts were all part of customary
international law in the period of 1975-1979. These crimes, as customary international law, are
prosecutable under Article 5 of the ECCC Law.
Customary international law is prosecutable.165 The ECCC in Prosecutor v. “Duch,” held,
“As regards relevant sources of international law applicable at the time, the Chamber may rely
on both customary and conventional international law, including the general principles of law
recognised by the community of nations.”166 The court continues stating:
Article 1 of the ECCC Law empowers the ECCC to “bring to trial senior leaders of [DK] and
those who were most responsible for the serious crimes and serious violations of Cambodian
penal law, international humanitarian law and custom, and international conventions recognized
by Cambodia, that were committed during the period from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979.167
The tribunal in Nuremberg held that it, “is not essential that a crime be specifically defined and
charged in accordance with a particular ordinance, statute, or treaty if it is made a crime by
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international convention, recognized customs and usages of war, or the general principles of
criminal justice common to civilized nations generally.”168
Because all of the enumerated offenses under Article 5 of the ECCC law were
unequivocally part of customary international law in the period of 1975-1979, Article 5 is
prosecutable.
IV. CONCLUSION
All nine of the enumerated crimes of Article 5 were considered customary international
law during the period of 1975-1979. The prohibitions of these crimes were part of the
widespread practice of states because the international community created numerous
international instruments meant to prohibit the occurrence of these crimes. The prohibitions of
these crimes were also opinio juris because the international community of states has made it a
priority to prosecute and punish the perpetrators of these acts. With the creation of the IMT in
1945, the ICTY in 1992, the ICTR in 1993, the SCSL in2002, and continuing through the ECCC
at present, the prosecution of war criminals and human rights violators has been one of the
international community’s top priorities. All of these crimes were clearly customary international
law during the period of 1975-1979.
The crimes enumerated under Article 5 are also prosecutable under Article 5. They form
part of customary international law, and the ECCC has held that customary international law is a
legitimate source to utilize in the prosecution of perpetrators of crimes against humanity.
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